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In his Political Guidelines, the Commission president Jean Claude Juncker stated that 
he aims for a “new European policy on legal migration.” One of the key initiatives 
is the review of the Blue Card for attracting highly skilled migrants. More recently, 
the Commission reaffirmed this objective in the European Agenda on Migration 
(COM(2015) 240 final). In elaborating the guidelines for the incoming five years 
(2015-2020), the overall priority set by the European Council (2014/C 240/05) is 
the consistent transposition, the effective implementation, and the consolidation of 
the legal instruments in place, while at the same time developing new strategies “to 
maximize the opportunities of legal migration.” Given this political mandate, and 
the new co-legislative role of the Parliament since 2009, it is reasonable to expect 
new initiatives in the area of labour migration. 
Attracting talent: justification for a common approach on skilled 
labour migration
EU labour migration policy is fragmented into several directives covering different 
types of migrants, i.e. highly skilled, seasonal workers and Intra-Corporate 
Transferees, plus a horizontal directive covering procedural issues and a set of 
rights for migrants. The reasons for such fragmentation are political and due to 
Member States’ reluctance to cede sovereignty to the EU level in this policy field. 
After the failure of the 2001 Proposal for a Directive on all economic migrants (COM 
(2001/C 332 E/08) 127 final), and the consequent public consultations, different 
stakeholders’ preferences had to be accommodated. The Commission opted for a 
partitioned approach to labour migration to overcome political deadlock (Roos 
2013, Menz 2015). The objectives of an EU labour migration policy are broader than 
those achievable by just addressing the immigration of highly skilled workers; yet, 
attracting highly qualified workers was a politically feasible way to address at least 
some of the goals. 
Three objectives can be traced back to the 2005 Commission Policy Plan on 
Legal Migration: the first is to address the decline in working age population and 
the increasing old-age dependency ratio. The issue came up as early as 2003, 
(Commission 2003) but it is still up-to-date, as recent studies show (for instance, 
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OECD\EU 2014). The second objective is to meet current and future labour demand. 
European economies already experience shortages in some sectors, for instance IT, 
health sector, and engineering (EMN 2011, Cedefop 2010). The third objective is 
linked to the goal of building a more dynamic knowledge-based economy. Several 
studies have shown the positive impact of highly skilled workers mobility on 
knowledge diffusion and overall economic competitiveness (Duncan 2012, Chiswick 
2011, OECD 2008). In this vein, the Commission identified attracting highly qualified 
workers as a mean to foster economic growth. The added value of European 
action in the area of highly qualified migrants is apparent: by presenting the 
EU as a common labour market and destination for immigrants with one set of 
admission rules, rather than 28 different ones, Member States are expected to be 
more successful in attracting the much wanted highly skilled workers. 
To meet these objectives, in May 2009, the Council, still functioning at that 
time under the unanimity rule, approved the BC Directive. The UK, Ireland and 
Denmark opted out; to date, the other Member States, many with considerable 
delay, have transposed the Directive into national legislation. The Commission 
presented the first report evaluating the Directive’s implementation in May 2014 
(COM (2014) 154 final).  
The content and implementation of the Directive
The BC Directive regulates the entry and residence conditions of highly qualified 
workers that have at least a one-year job offer in a Member State. Compared 
to other immigration directives, it grants a particularly favourable set of 
rights for long-term residency and immediate family reunification. During the 
negotiations, Member States agreed on a broad leeway in deciding how to enact 
particular provisions. As a consequence, the implementation of the Directive has 
been very divergent. 
First of all, highly skilled workers can be categorized differently by Member 
States. A highly skilled worker is defined as a person holding a higher professional 
qualification (from a post-secondary higher education programme lasting at 
least three years). However, the national legislation may also include a person 
with at least five years of professional experience in a relevant sector. Currently, 
the majority of EU countries require a formal qualification, while 10 Member 
States consider the experience derogation. The scheme is demand-based. 
Accordingly, a job offer by an employer determines admission. The minimum 
salary threshold to qualify as highly skilled lies at 1.5 times the average gross 
annual salary in the state. For workers particularly in need in the technical, 
administrative and managerial area there is the possibility to lower the salary 
threshold to 1.2 times the national average. In the transposition, some Member 
States made reference to the average gross annual, monthly salary, or minimum 
wage. According to the Commission Report, as many as 10 Member States have 
incorrectly transposed the salary threshold provision, although to a different 
extent: some states require a salary threshold only slightly under the Directive’s 
limit, like Portugal and Slovenia; others impose a threshold considerably below, 
like Italy and Malta.
As Member States may apply more favourable provisions or even run national 
parallel programmes to attract highly skilled migrants, they may decide to 
apply more restrictive clauses. A cap may be set in order to limit the number 
of applications: 8 Member States transposed this possibility, and currently 
Cyprus has a quota of 0. National legislation may also foresee carrying out the 
labour market test to verify the availability of a European citizen for the job. The 
majority of Member States have transposed this option.
The section in the Directive about rights has fewer discretionary clauses. With 
regard to mobility within the labour market, any employment change requires 
authorization during the first two years; afterwards Member States may decide 
to grant free access to highly qualified employment. To access the long-term 
residency status after 5 years, the BC holder may benefit from longer periods of 
absence than non-highly qualified migrants, and may cumulate the time spent 
in different EU countries. Finally, with regard to mobility, the BC holder may 
apply to work in another Member State after 18 months.
The effectiveness of the Directive
Since one objective of the Directive was to increase the number of highly skilled 
workers, (COM (2007) 637 final) one simple way to measure its success is to 
assess how many BCs were issued. However, the causal impact of immigration 
policy on the actual movement of people is not easy to identify. In general, 
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Figure 1. BC vis-à-vis national programmes (NP), 2012-2013. Eurostat data 
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migration laws are only one factor among many determining the migrant’s 
decision on country of destination (Boeri et al. 2012). Therefore, I suggest to 
compare the number of BCs and national permits for highly qualified workers. 
Theoretically, three observations are possible. First, many more national permits 
are issued than BCs. This means that the Member State is somehow attractive, 
but the BC is not. In this case, the BC has not been effective in achieving its goal 
of creating an attractive scheme. Moreover, if Member States themselves may 
put in place a more attractive scheme, the rationale of the BC is also undermined, 
as it would be redundant compared to national initiatives. Second, the number 
of BCs and national permits issued are similar.  This means that they are either 
equivalent or that they target different categories of migrants. Third, the number 
of BCs is much higher than national permits. This shows that the BC introduced 
an attractive policy for immigration of highly skilled workers. 
According to EUROSTAT data, the number of BCs issued remains low, and, in the 
majority of Member States, permits issued under national programmes for highly 
qualified workers exceed the BCs. A considerable exception is Germany, where 
the BCs were mainly conversions from other permits. As a positive aspect for 
assessing the success of the Directive, 7 countries, mainly from Eastern Europe, 
did not issue national permits for highly skilled before the implementation, but 
did start to issue BCs. Another indicator for its relative success is the increase 
in the BCs issued in 15 countries in 2013 compared to 2012. In 6 cases (BE, 
DE, FR, IT, LU, SE), this happened while the national permits were decreasing. 
However, 4 Member States (ES, NL, PL, PT, FI) seem to favour the national route: 
national permits increased, while BCs decreased, or increased to very limited 
extent. Overall, among those states that have a considerable (more than 1000) 
inflow of highly skilled migrants (DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, AT, SE), only in Germany is the 
number of BCs higher than the number of national permits in 2013. This means 
that so far the BC has shown only a very limited success. 
Another objective of the BC was to create a common EU-wide procedure for 
highly skilled immigrants. The BC certainly introduced a programme for highly 
qualified third country nationals in countries where none existed before – 
e.g. Romania, Cyprus, Poland – or only specific provisions for highly qualified 
applicants were in place - like Italy, Sweden and Belgium. Yet, if the extent 
of leeway in implementation is considered, Member States can reduce the 
commonness of the EU-wide scheme to a commonly used label. 
The existence of parallel national schemes is not necessarily negative: they can 
play a complementary role to the BC if they target a different group of highly 
skilled workers. For example, national schemes could address self-employed or 
job-seekers, who are currently excluded from the BC. However, if they target 
the same group of migrants, there is overlap and competition: on the one hand, 
this may lead the national schemes to include more liberal provisions and to 
attract more highly skilled; on the other hand, it would seriously undermine 
the harmonization and branding objectives of the BC. In the latter case, the BC 
would have succeeded in creating minimum conditions for the highly skilled, but 
would have failed in creating an EU programme and the very added value of the 
Directive would need to be redefined. 
Recommendations 
The political climate for a recast of the Directive is good: in the Parliament, the 
European People’s Party (PPE 2015) and the Alliance for Liberal and Democrats 
for Europe Party (ALDE 2015) explicitly support the improvement and broadening 
of the BC. Within the Council, Member States can be divided into four groups: 
those that oppose more EU initiative in migration policy; those that have 
an interest in making the BC more attractive, since they lacked a selective 
policy before implementing the Directive; those that have no direct interest 
in reviewing the BC since they have more competitive national schemes (like 
the Netherlands, Austria and Spain); and finally one Member State that has no 
reason for improving the BC, since it has been working well as it is (Germany). 
With qualified majority voting, a Commission proposal should gain the support 
of the third group. At the same time, the Commission should study German 
compliance and implementation to understand which mechanism enables the 
functioning of the Blue Card. 
To overcome the shortcomings of the BC, several actions at different levels 
should be put in place: firstly, at the level of the Directive and its provisions; 
secondly, at the level of complementary initiatives, and finally, at a general level. 
Some provisions of the BC have discouraging effects for attracting global talent. 
The transposition figures of the salary threshold and the lower or absent threshold 
in the parallel national schemes show that 1.5 times the national gross average 
salary is too high a threshold and too rigid as a bottom limit. It fails to take into 
account sectoral distinctions and the wage structure of the country. Moreover, 
highly qualified workers are very diverse and do not equally fit into the same 
regulatory framework. The salary for young workers, for example, tends to be 
lower than the salary of workers in senior positions, and this should be taken into 
account if the EU wants to attract also young professionals. Similarly, students 
who graduated at EU universities are highly qualified and have gained experience 
in Europe, and possibly of the labour market. Favourable derogations for them, in 
terms of salary or access to long-term residency, should be envisaged. Regarding 
the minimum length of the contract, the one year requirement excludes many 
jobs that are shorter and project-based. Furthermore, it is not apparent what the 
BC offers that national schemes do not. Although it is certainly true that the BC 
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holders can move to other Member States, no more favourable provisions derive 
from them already being granted a BC in one country. To obtain a BC in another 
country they need to undergo the admission procedure again. 
At the level of complementary initiatives, improving information is pivotal. 
Official information should target potential applicants - who should have the 
option to compare their perspectives in Member States - and employers - who 
are often small and medium sized enterprises lacking the relevant knowledge 
about foreign education systems and labour markets. Involving intermediary 
agents, either from the public or from the private sector, can ease the process 
of information collection. Moreover, the services of EURES, the European Job 
Mobility Portal, can be made available to third country nationals.  Providing EU 
entrance schemes for highly qualified workers certainly requires shared rules on 
which qualifications are considered for admission. At the moment, there is no 
common system for the recognition of foreign qualifications and an application 
may be accepted in one country but rejected in another. This undoubtedly 
obstructs the creation of a common labour market and impairs intra-EU mobility.
At a more general level, a more comprehensive approach of conceiving labour 
migration is needed. The focus on highly skilled migrants has represented a 
strategy to overcome the political deadlock, and in fact, the 2001 proposal for a 
Directive did not even make reference to highly skilled workers. The subsequent 
partitioning approach may be a compromise to indeed achieve a common policy 
(Roos 2013), but it should not come at the expense of a comprehensive migration 
policy covering many different types of labour migrants - high, medium, and 
lower skilled. The EU does not only need highly skilled workers, as the lists of 
hard-to-fill professions in Member States show. Unemployed local workers do 
not necessarily have the low and medium skills required for taking up jobs in 
shortage; moreover, they may not be willing to engage in some sectors that 
remain migrants-dominated (Triandafyllidou and Marchetti 2014). In spite of 
the Commission’s reference to a comprehensive approach, (Press Conference 
for the Presentation of the Agenda on Migration - 13 May 2015) not a single 
item on the agenda concerns the medium skilled. This means that the common 
skill-based approach will remain partial and insufficient to address the labour 
market needs of the European economy. Within the same objectives of tackling 
labour shortages and the decline of the working-age population, the possibility 
to widen the scope of the BC such as to also include medium-skilled migrants 
should be envisaged. 
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